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KINDRED SPIRIT OR OPPORTUNISTIC ALLY?
POLISH ATLANTICISM IN THE 21sT CENTURY
Elizabeth Schmitz-Robinson
Since emerging from the shado w of communism at the C old War's end , Poland has
undoubtedly been one of the most spirited Atlanticists in Europe. Following its 1999 admis-
sion to NATO, Poland's enthusiastically pro-American stance was evidenced hy a stro ng
preference for US leadership in defense and security matters, as well as robust suppo rt of
American foreign polic y. This close friend ship with America appeared all the mo re deeply
entrenched wh en viewed against a backgr ound of "transatlanti c drift " and cooling affinity
for the Un ited States among Poland 's fellow European s. Ind eed , some regard Poland 's
Atlanticism during this peri od as " instinctual," un conditional and unalt erabl e: something
entirely prompted hy constant histori c, ethnic, cultural and ideological honds.
The intensity of Poland 's pro-US orientation steadil y increased during th e first years of
the 21st cent ury , until reaching its peak in 2003. Despite its strength , a closer examination
of the motive s hehind Poland's pre-2004 Atlanticism points to the conclusion that a great
deal of this or ientation was neither unqualified nor unthinking, but was heavily driven by
strategic calculations of national interest, and thus subj ect to change. The supp osition that
Poland 's pro-American stance prio r to 2004 was tran sient and conditional. and thu s canno t
be com pletely att ributed to un changing facto rs such as CO l11mOIl ties is furth er suppo rted by
the marked decline of thi s fervent form of Atlanticism after th is point.
THE FOUNDATION OF POLISH ATLANTICISM
The roo rs of Polish Atlanticism can he traced to th e end of the Cold War. In fact,
the leaders of Poland and other Ce ntral and Eastern Europ ean states began to discuss the
po ssihility of NATO membership even before the official dissolution of the W arsaw Pact
in 1991 (jacob y 236) . After ove rcoming their initi al fears of angering Russia with NATO
enlargem ent , the US became the prima ry proponent fo r co mme ncing the membership pro-
cess with Poland, as well as th e Cz ech Republic and Hungary at the 1997 Madrid NATO
sununit (Yost 104). These proceedings culminated wi th Poland 's 199<) ascension to the Al-
liance in the first round of po st-C old War enlargement . Thus, the promptness with which
Poland pursued NATO membership and the strong Am erican hacking for thi s endeavor
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would seem to support the idea that Polisli Atl anticism is deepl y ent renched and caused , at
least in part . by stro ng histori cal bonds.
The cama raderie between Poland and the U S is further stre ngt hene d by e thnic. cul-
tural and ideological ties, which remain a co nstant co ntribu ting facto r to Pol ish Atlanticism ,
For instance, in an April 28th , 200:\ int ervi ew in Warsaw, th en-President Kwasniewski
stated that much of Poland's close relationship w ith the U S could be attributed to the fact
th at " [ajln ios t nine million people in tlie United States acknowledge th eir Polish roots.
O nly Warsaw has m ore Poles Jiving there tlian the state o f New York. So our feelin gs
for America arc ve ry strong" (" Po land's Kwas niewski Views Po stwar Iraq, T ies with U S.
EU, Russia, O w n Future," 28 Apr. 0:\). Ad ditionally, th en-foreign minister Wlodzimierz
Ci moszewicz stated in a 200:\ interview th at afte r September 11 th, Poland "supported the
peopl e and th e values that had been attacked " (" Po lish For eign Minister on US-European
R elations, Plan e Acquisit ion , Iraq ") . The state ments of these Poli sh leaders wo uld see m to
suggest that Poland 's friend ship with th e U S is an inhe re n t feature of th e nati onal identity
due to the ethnic , cultural and ideological ties between th e tw o nations. If th ese static facto rs
were to be accepted as the sole raison detre behind Polish Arlanticism, it w ould appear that
Poland 's robust Atlanticism pri or to 2004 w as auto m atic and inflexible in nature .
A BACKGROUND OF "TRANSATLANTIC DRIFT"
The app earance of intrau sient Polish Atlanticism between 1999 and 2004 is furthe r
strengthened by the context of "transatlantic drift" in which it occurred . Scho lars have
pointed to th e presen ce of " a deep split .. .dev eloping.. .between the United States and west-
ern Eu rope" even prior to th e (Illout ov er Iraq (Lundestad 25) . Two m ajor causes for thi s
increase in co nflic t are th e " the inc reasing unilareralism of the United States" and an " E U
[which] is growing closer togeth er" (Lundestad 16, 26). As European integration has ac-
celerated in th e 21st century, the EU has become stronger and more able to challenge the
formerly unri valed influence of the world's current hegemon. The incre asing tendency of
Europe to look inward for leade rship rather th an to the U S, as w ell as the heightened fre-
quency o f critiques o f US unilarerali sm , po int to a net-decrease o f European Atlanticism in
the years before 2004.
Thus, any demonstration of Poland's Atlantic orientation during thi s period took place
against a prevailin g trend of " transatlant ic drifi ." When co m bined with th e foundation of
Polish Atlanricism in intransient factors suc h as ideological, ethnic and histori c ties, it m ay
;lppear to some th at Pol and 's pro-US ori entati on during the time was fund amental, instin c-
tual and un assailable. This idea is well-illustrated in a M ay 2003 pie ce in th e London T imes,
which states " Poles and Americans have co me to a shared understanding of the world .. .
rAJ self- confide nt East (perhaps lead by Pol and) could help to correct r" a wave of post-
Arlanti cisni in Western Europe"] .. .for th e regi on has nev er lost its faith in the American
dream " (Boyes). H o we ver, a closer examination o f th e m oti ves behind Poland's Atlanricisr
stance prior to 2004 demon strates that a substantial part of thi s orientation was not au to matic
but was driv en by changeable calculations of national intere st in terms of political influ en ce ,
economic concerns and security issues of th e time.
POLISH ATLANTICISM: POLAND'S PREFERENCE FOR NATO
Poland 's Atl antic tend en cie s between 1<)99 and 2004 we re manifested in a strong pre-
dilection for U S leadership in defense and sec urity m att er s. The most co m pelling exa mple
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of the profu ndity of Polish Atlanti cism o n the se issues was Poland' s stro ng endo rseme nt of
the supremacy and preferability of NAT O to the Eur opean Security and Defe nse Policy
(ESO P) in the years befor e 2004.
The ESO P repr esent s the creation of a securi ty force capable of carry ing out peace-
keeping, peace-making, humanitarian and crisis management tasks, und er the jurisdiction
of the EU and operational outside of NATO's aut hori ty (H aine 44). Developm ent of the
ESOP ent ails the EU "aquir jing] the capacities and capabil ities... to execut e [a milit ary]
ope ration .. .using European assets.. .[with] autonom ous action" (Boyer 4) . O f course, the
199R St. Malo agreeme nt founding ESOP states that its members must act " in co nformiry
wi th [their] respec tive obligatio ns in NA T O " CSt. Ma lo Declaration ," qed. in Haine 43).
Thus, in princ iple, ESO P repres ent s a balance " betw een the auto nomy asserted" by the
EU and a continuing co mmitment to "c onformity with the Atlantic Allian ce" (Haine 43).
H owever, this [ ICt was often buri ed und er a tan gled web of diplomatic , political and eco -
nomic co ntroversies that arose aro und this issue.
The primary poin t of co ntention ove r ESOP developme nt was that it was often seen
to repres en t a threat to the integri ty and prima cy of NATO as the dominant enforcer of
European security. As Haine explains in his articl e on the topi c, " this new European struc -
ture gave the United States the impression that th e ESOP woul d becom e a rival." alth ou gh
he states that this imp ression was not entirely justified (137) . This pe rcept ion was present
in 2003, when "in late April, Schroder , C hirac and their Belgian and Luxemb ourg co un-
terparts ostent atiously met. . .. to start a European defe nse avan t- garde that the United States
und erstood as a challenge to NATO and Am erican leadership " (Po nd 49). Whether or not
ESOP trul y imperils NATO is a point that co ntinues to be up for debate. H owever , th e part
of the issue pertinent to a discussion of Polish Atlanticism is that ESOP was often perceived
as a threat to NATO du ring this period , both by Polish leadership and by dominant voices
in the first Bus h administration.
III kee ping with this strong Atlanticism. Poland vehement ly defend ed the supremac y
of N AT O ove r ESOP in the years lead ing up to 2004 . The Poles' stance on this matt er was
largely con gru ent with the Americans'; an "issue where W arsaw 's and Was hington's posi-
tions bro adly co nverged has been the EU's plan to develop .. .ESOP ... with the capabili ty of
undert akin g defense and security opera tions aut on om ou s of NATO authority (Z aboro wski
and Lon ghu rst 101(l). During th is period , the Polish governme nt officially "ac ceptjed]"
ESOP; howe ver, any endorsement of it was always qualifi ed with the un condition al caveat
that "the EU should never strive to substitu te for NATO" (T rzaskowski, "Poland" 20) .
Illustrati ve of Poland's stance on the issue are its leaders' 2003 reactions to a discussion re-
garding ESO P at an O cto ber 16-1 7th EU leaders' summit. T hese includ e then Prim e M in-
ister Leszek Miller declarin g Polish oppositio n to "a ny Europ ean de fense force that wou ld
provide an 'alte rnative' to NATO, " as well as Poland's amb assador to N ATO stating that
"EU defense mu st 'supplem ent' NATO instead of ,replacing' it" ("FMA 12 Nov") . In sum ,
the Polish stance prior to 200 4 was characterized by reserve towards ESOP , and a vehem ent
de fense of NA TO as the pr incipal and domin ant mechanism for European security.
As Lundestad put s it, "NATO has been the USA 's pr imary instrument for taki ng
charge in Atlantic affairs" (28). Insofar as Am erica has been the traditi onal leader of the
Alliance, Poland' s co ntin ued devot ion to NATO abo ve all othe r security instituti ons does
seem to indica te a deep-seated pro-US ori enta tio n. T o some , Poland 's stro ng prefere nce
for the primacy of N AT O over ESO P befor e 2004 co uld be viewe d as illustrative of an
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unquestioning Atlanricism motivated solely by respect for the deeply entrench ed historic,
id eol ogical and ethnic ties which fonn th e un changing roots of Po land 's friendship with the
U S. H o wever, a more co mp re hensive an alysis of the m otivation s behind Poland 's stance
o n ESDP points to th e fact that the state's Atl anri cism OJl th is issue was more st rateg ic than
automa tic, and was in part dri ven by calculatio ns o f nati on al int erest.
The fIrSt of th ese strategic moti vations was Poland 's desire to assert influ en ce and oc-
cupy a position of leadership in matters pertaining to its secur ity and defense. For instance,
th e 1999 Helsinki meeting establishing th e "Headline G oals" for ESDP development re-
sulted in an agreement wh ich stated th at any non-EU European nation could co nt ribute to
crisis man agement mi ssion s, but would have no decision-making ability within th em, which
" was co nsequently viewed by Warsaw as un sati sfactory" (Za bo rowski and Longhurst 1017 ).
In co nt rast, security organizatio ns under the full authori ty of NATO were seen as " mo re
inclusive, as [they] inv olved Poland ... in th eir capacities as full members of the Alliance"
(Zaborowski 17). Thus, a great part of Poland 's initial preference for the primacy of NATO
in European security affilirs before 2004 was due to the fact that NATO offer ed Poland, as
a full IIIem ber, the ability to have a say in matters of collectiv e defense. On th e o the r hand,
ESDP would ha ve limited Poland, (w ho was not yet an EU member). to th e role of assistant
rather than a partner in leadership .
This position Illay see m slightly irrat ion al in the later years of thi s per iod , as by 2003,
Poland 's entry into th e EU was largely foreseeable. H owever, membership did not consti-
tute a guarant ee for leadership opportunities in the field of European security . For instance,
in 2003, "France, C ermany and the United Kingdom ... [showed] an increasing tendency ...
to operate . . .on behalf of th eir colleagu es" in European security policy (Duke 5) . It ap-
peared to Poland at the tim e that thi s " EU3" constitu ted most of the drive behind ESDP
devel opment, a lead ership body whi ch see med poi sed to co nt inue in th e future . Thus,
it is understandable that "Warsaw ... reacted with skepticism towards the prospect of an
emerging Franco-Brirish-Cennan dircctoirc as a leading group in European secur ity matters"
(Z ab orowski 21) . Additionally, events suc h as Chirac's scold ing of Poland's suppo rt for the
US ' intentions toward Iraq in 2003 cau sed Poland to assume that their voice on defense and
security issues would m ost likel y be co -opted by m ore-established EU countries. In short,
the C hirac " incident illustrated ... It]h e assum ptio n that the accessio n countries...sho uld be
co m pliant with the larger M ember States .. . [and] [t]h at the acceding countries sho uld not
assum e equal wei ght in ... security matters which are view ed primarily as th e domain of the
larger member stat es" (Duke 4).
In contrast , th e co nt inuation of a US-led NATO as the primary vehicle for Euro-
pean sec urity seemed to promise Poland a leadership role, an issue which will be furth er
ex plored in the di scu ssion of the Iraq W ar in the next sect io n. As stated in a 2002 Warsaw
R zeczpospolita articl e , " as. .. our position in the Europ ean Union is un certain , Poland has
no alternative but to tighten its allian ce w ith Washington . This is the only insurance poli cy
access ible to us" ("Analyst Views Arguments For, Again st Polish lnvolvemenr in US -L ed
Strike on Iraq"). Like man y other less-p owerful European co untries. Poland saw a Europe
dominated by Euro-giants, such as Fran ce , as presenting strict limits on its ability to occupy
a position of an y significan ce. Ameri ca's co nt inued inv olvement in European politics and
;Iffilirs represented , to some extent, a check o n this trend o f increa sing domination by Euro-
pean power-poles in thi s realm. As R oberto Ducci said of the comparabl e Italian view point
regarding US versus Fren ch influence in European politi cs, "the richest and farthest master
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is alw ays best" (qtd. in Nuti 177). In sum, even with E U membe rship in sig ht, N AT O
see m ed to offer Po land th e co nt in ued posit ion as a co -l ead er while ESOP appeared likel y
to subo rd inate the nation to the w hims of E U gian ts. Thus, th e ex te nt to w hich Poland 's
strategic calc u lations of ho w best to exert in flue nce cannot be underestim ared as a m oti ve
fo r p re ferr ing NATO o ver ESO P, mak ing their Atlanticism seem slig htly less unqu estioning
and intransient .
Sec o nd, Po land's preferen ce for NAT O over ESO P was in part mot ivated by variable
eco no m ic cos t-benefi t calculatio ns in terms of co ntributio ns and exp ect ed gains. Acco rdin g
to W ad e Jaco by, in the first years of th e 2 1st ce n tury, Po land demonstrated a " pro fo u nd re-
luct ance to spe nd m oney o n m ilitary m odernizati on at a tim e w hen so nlany othe r dom estic
need s seernj ed] to deserve high priority" (jacoby 234). Addi tio nally, " hig h CEE infl at ion
rapi dly eroded defense budget s" in countries such as Poland (jacoby 238) . Yet, a nat ion
so historically prone to invasio n could not be left undefended . NAT O offe red Poland th e
answer. In th e years before 2003, " the governm e nt of th e U nited States mad e <I conside red
j udgm e nt to trad e awa y pre ssu re on th e newer NATO m embers to up grade th ei r mi litary
capabilities in exc hange fo r d isplays of politi cal loyal ty " (jacoby 232) . T hus, the co st for
Po land's protect ion via NAT O was alm ost exclusively limited to Poland 's suppo rt o f th e
United Sta res (suc h as in Iraq) . Prior to 2004 , thi s support seem ed a cheap price to pay in
com pariso n to th e cos t of m odernizing th eir mi litary, and eve n see med to promise to bring
with it a whole range of ben efits, as will be exa mi ned in th e next secti on of th is paper. T hus,
before 2004, Poland and other " CEE gover nments ... fou nd it easie r to de live r policy loyalty
tha n military co m pe te nce " (lacob y 24 9).
T herefo re , N AT O accommodated Poland's inab ilit y to P<l Y for expensive modern-
ization initiatives, whil e no ne the less guaranteeing its sec u ri ty th ro ugh th e provisions o f
Article 5. O n the other han d , m any in Poland "voiced co ncern about the cos t of a separate
European defen se" ("FMA 12 Nov") . Poland had no reaso n to expect that the EU lead-
ers would be as accom modat ing as w as th e US in terms of ex pe ct ed co nrribu rions , suc h as
th ose o u tli ned in the H elsin ki H eadlin e GO<lIs. T hus, th e fac t th at NA T O represented a
much cheape r way of sec uri ng its defen se cannot be un derest imated as a Illative for Poland 's
sup po rt of th e primacy of a U S-led NAT O in European secu ri ty , and th e depth of th eir
Atl anticism must be assessed accordingly.
Fin ally, th e Polish posit ion o n ESO P an d NAT O before 2004 was to some degree
m oti vated by stra tegic calc ula tions of th e relati ve viability and effec tive ness of th e two se-
cur ity regim es, especially with regard to Pola nd's co nti nued perceptio n of a Russian threat.
According to Z aborowski and Longhurst , " Po land' s positio n ... borderin g th e former Soviet
Union m eans th at Poland' s secu ri ty poli cies. . .remain .. .fixa ted with the issue of territorial
defense . . . Unsurprisingl y, ther e remai ns a stro ng preferen ce in Pol and for an Am erican -l ed
NAT O w hic h is able to execu te Article 5" (10 13-1014) . Thus, Polan d 's geopo litica l situ a-
tio n as a state very vulnerable to atta ck does seem to nec essitate its having the strongest fon n
of secu rity available . Poland 's obj ectio ns to ESO P in cluded concerns that "the E U would
be dupli catin g existing struc tures and thi s would weaken th e alliance" as well as th e fact that
" D efense Minister Ja nusz O nyszk iewicz criticized th e EU plan as.. .lackin g in military and
operatio na l viability" (Z abo ro wski and Longhurst 101 7). T hus, it is no surp rise th at Po land
was less th an ent husiastic about a poli cy w hich seemed to them to bo th threat en th e wea k-
eni ng of existing defense st ruc tu res while o ffering something less effec tive in exch an ge. As
stated in a 2003 Ca zeta Wybo rcza articl e, " the US .. .[is] th e on.ly real gua rant or of Poland's
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security, as COIIIIIIOII foreign and security policy remains largely o n paper, and Paris and
Berlin's attempts to dev elop a policy aimed in fact against the US weaken ... NATO" (" Iraq
to Prevent Alienating EU partn ers, Poland H as to Become Inv olved in Building a C ommon
Foreign and Security Policy") . Thus, at least until 20 04 , the Pol ish seeme d to view ESOP
as some thing more aspirati onal th an function al.
T his perceived lack of viability was un acceptable in the face of what the Poles felt to be
th e co nt inued threat of Russian aggression, however unlikely. For instance, among the rea-
sons provid ed by one Polish j ournalist for Poland to "tighten its alliance with Washington"
on security matters was that "R ussia is regaining its balance" ("Analyst Views Arguments
For , Against Polish Involv ement in US-Led Strike on Iraq .") In short, Poland did not feel it
had the luxu ry at the time to take its chances o n a secur ity system less established and robust
than NATO .
Thus, in the years leading up to 2004, it is clear that variable calculations of oppo r-
tunities for leadership , eco no mic cost-benefit analysis and viability were far from absent in
influ en cin g Poland's decision to vehemently advocate the primacy of NATO over ESOP.
Consequently, the Polish stance on the matter was not solely a result of intransient ethnic,
histori c and ideol ogical bonds. Therefore, Poland's support for US leadership in security
and defense matters, vis a vis NATO, does not enable its classification as an unquestioning,
unshakable Atlanti cist. but as a savvy and deliberate o ne.
POLISH ATLANTICISM: SUPPORT FOR US FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAQ
The second most visible way in whi ch Poland demonstrated its Atlanticist tend encies
between 1999 and 2004 was through its near-faultless supp ort of US foreign policy. The
most co mpe lling exa mp le of thi s is Poland 's vehe me n tly pro-US position on th e issue of
Iraq . H owever, as with ESOP, a closer exa m inatio n of the moti vation s behind th is o rien-
tation w ill once again reveal that Polish Atlant icism was not so blind nor so auto matic as
it ma y have seemed, and was in part dri ven by strategic m oti vation s rather than solely by
int ransient bonds.
During this peri od, Po land favored a world in which th e United States led, a prefer-
ence whi ch extended even to explicit end orsements of US hegem on y. For instance, in a
Janu ary 2003 visit to West Point , President Kw asnie wski "a pplauded the United States's
[sir] leading role in th e world , stating that it is both 'unquestionable and that it sho uld be
exercised" (Z aborowski 7). Additionally, in the years following Septem ber 11th , Poland
was " one of the very few European countries prepared to un conditionally support American
forei gn policy" (Zab orowski 8). This pro-US alignment on issues of global politi cs peaked
in 2003 in the context of the Iraq conflict. Ind eed , at this m oment in history, nev er had Po-
land 's relati on ship with th e US been so close, support been so stro ng nor the contrast with
othe r nati ons been so drawn . In light of thi s, 2003 can be viewed as the peak of Poland 's
Atlant icism,
While the US battled to gain acceptance for their proposed invasion in Iraq, Poland's
backing on this divisiv e issue was vigorous. In 2003 Poland "fa mo usly joined Britain, Spain,
Italy , Portugal [the C zec h Republic and Hungary] and D enmark in publishing an open
lett er in support of President Bush's policy toward Iraq" (jacob y 24')). This loyalty was all
the m ore noti ceable when co nt rasted with th e outright oppos ition the US encounte red
from other Atlanti c allies. " France and Germ an y, whi ch had led the resistan ce to US and
Br it ish polic y in Iraq, interpreted this... [lett er] as contrary to th e European and , inde ed , the
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EU line . . .Fren ch president j acques C hirac . . .fum ed that th e C EE states 'could hardl y have
fou nd a better wa y' of '[diuuni shing] thei r chances of ente ring Europe" (jacob y 249). T hus,
to some extent Iraq represented a dilemma in which Po land had to cho ose between pleasin g
th e power-players of an EU in whi ch they were in th e process of joining, and remaining
tru e to their histori c Atlanti c ties. T he fact that Poland chose to back the US o n this issue ,
espec ially at a time wh en th eir place within the EU was being determined . wo uld seem to
emphasize th eir strong Atlanti cism.
Poland 's support was not confined to th e dipl omatic realm . T he Poles showed early on
that the y were willing to back their wo rds with military co nuui nne nts, " Pola nd was clearly
the most stalwa rt suppo rter of US pol icy; the Pol ish foreig n minister had indicated by late
j anuary 2003 that Poland wo uld take part in a war wit h Iraq even witho ut a UN resoluti on "
(jacoby 250). Poland's promises were actualized in the months that followed. T he nation 's
contribution included th e deployment of " Po lish spec ial units fighting under US co mmand
d uring the com bat ope ration" as we ll as its subseq uent acce ptance of " respo nsibility for
one of th e four occ upation zo ne in sout h-c entral Iraq . . . [in] Septem ber 200r (Za borowski
11). Again, thi s support was all the more co nspicuo us given th e fact that the "coalition of
the willin g" backing th e US militarily was by no means a broad collect ion of allies. In fact,
" the level of Pola nd's support for US action in Iraq surprised many of its European allies. ..
earning [it] the dubiou s title o f 'Am erica's T roja n donkey" (Za bo rowski 11). T he fact that
Poland was willing to risk so much polit ically to sup po rt the US wo uld seem at first to give
credit to its po rt rayal as an unfailing Atlanticist.
It was this intense lo yalty, tangible military support, and background of western C on-
tinental criticism which caused man y leaders o n both sides of th e Atlant ic to posit th at
Am erica was shifting th e nexus of its Atlant ic ties from its histor ic allies in the west, to a
more-receptive east. In 2003 , "Poland [had] been praised and brand ed in th e US as a 'new
European ,' [by Rumsfeld] as opposed to the 'old Euro peans' .. .wh o opposed US policy on
Iraq" (Za bo rows ki and Long hurst 10 10). Poland und oubtedl y stood out as th e poster child
of this " new Europe. " As President Bush stated in 2003 , " Was hi ngton had ' no better frien d
in Europe '" ("Analysts Ex pec t Ne w E U Members' Support for US to W ane").
In view of both th e trend of western Continental det achment from Was hington as
we ll as overt conde m nation of its suppo rters , the int ense friendship kindled between Poland
and the US during thi s tim e co uld lead some to charac terize Poland as an unqu estioning
and un com promising Atlanticist. How ever, as was th e case wit h ESO P, a closer scrutiny
of some of th e 11I0re strategic motives that prompted Poland 's stance reve al that its pro-US
orientation on Iraq was significantly influenced by calculations of how best to maximize
nation al int erest at th e tim e, rath er than being solely dri ven by intransient histori c, ethnic
and ideological ties.
The first of the se transitory moti vation s was Po land's econ omic cost-b en efit analysis of
involvement in Iraq. T o at least som e ex tent, Poland was influ en ced by consi deration of th e
financi al ben efits their support would entail. For instance, jacob y states that "several Poli sh
elites . . .spoke candidly abo ut th eir desi res to see Polish firm s win lu crative co nt racts in th e
reco nstruction era" (253) . In 2003 , Polish leade rs were definit ely cogniza nt of the possibility
that their diplomatic and military suppo rt for Am erica would be rewarded with profitable
opportunities for Poli sh com panies. Additionally, th en-foreign mi nister Wl odzimierz C i-
moszewicz we nt so far as to say that wh en deciding to bec ome involved in Iraq, the Polish
government "wa nted Polish petrochemi cal com panies to finally gain direct access to sources
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of petroleum " (Cwieluch) . These expectations we re enough that had th ey been met , th e
initia l Polish expen d iture in sup po rt of thei r ally wo uld have yielded very high gains in-
stead of losses. The image of Poland "an[ing] as a loyal, co nsiste nt alliance partner" o ut
of complet ely altru istic motives is further m arred by th e fact that " the Am ericans pa[id] for
everything" in the wa y of logistics, troop transportation , quartering cost and even the cost
associate d wit h financing the reco nstruct ion of the stabilizatio n zon e (Cwieluch). Finally, as
was ment ion ed earlier in regard to security matt ers, Poland' s support for US foreign po licy
in Iraq also entailed dec reased Am erican expectations of Po land's contributio ns to NA TO ,
in terms of expensive modernization measures and mil itary upgrades (jacoby 232). Thus,
suppo rting the US in Iraq seenled to represent a mi nim al short term cost while pro mising
a very large payoff in bo th th e near future and lon g run . It is no stre tch to say that the se
considera tio ns were a significant facto r in Poland 's decision to support th e US, making its
alignme nt seem less aut omatic and dr iven by a regard for histo ric bon ds.
A second factor tha t points to Pola nd as less than un con diti on al in its suppo rt was th at
thi s backing was to some ex tent mot ivated by a desire to assume a positio n of leadership. In
order to sec ure th eir position in th e world , states must accumulate pow er. Poland is no ex-
ceptio n; "[o]nly 15 years after regaining its sov ereignty, Poland continu es to be uncertain of
its place .. . and [is] de te rm ine d to be recognized as a major Europ ean player" (Zaborowski
8) . T he rift bet ween tradi tiona l Eur op ean power poles such as France and Ge rma ny, and
the US over Iraq represented to Poland a rare and valuable chance to diffe rentia te itself from
western C ontinental Europe and to align with a some wha t isolated hegemon. As a Warsaw
Rzeczpospolit a articl e states, because "of thi s split. .. the rank of Po land as a US partner
increased beyon d all ex pec tatio ns" ("Article D iscusses Imp act of Alliance with US .. ."). Po-
land 's heightened impo rtance to the US, its leaders presum ed , wo uld translat e into tangible
opportun ities to assert influence and practi ce leadership (as well as stre ngt hen norms of mu -
tual defense with the US) . As a result of its support , Z aborowski and Lon ghurst state, Poland
" is likely to be amon g th e group of states shaping the new Eu rop e and its foreign po licy"
(1010) . By some acco unts th en, Po land believed th e US wo uld reward Poland 's loyalty by
sponsoring it in becouung a leader in its region . ln contrast, Europea n po wer- players such as
Fran ce seeme d poised to limit any movem ent o n the part of the Poles to exercise initiative
and leadership. as is evide nced by C hirac's demeaning remo nstratio ns of Poland 's diploma tic
support of US foreign policy in Iraq in 200 3. Jacob y em phasizes the fact that Po land saw
Iraq as a means to expa nd its influen ce and sho w lead ership when he states that , in reference
to Poland 's inv olvem ent, "bein g a poli cy-maker on the w orld stage was m ore rewarding
than being a policy-taker on the Euro pea n one" (233) . Participation in Iraq , th en, seeme d
to Poland to offe r th e oppo rtuni ty to shed its cloa k of an oft- do minated nation and assume
a ma ntl e of responsibility in th e wo rld .
Thus, in th e face of the preponderance of economic and political benefits which par-
ticipation in Iraq appeared to offer Poland, it wo uld be diffic ult to characterize Po lish sup-
port on the issue as a mani festation of its un qu estio ning lo yalty to the US. It seems highl y
likely that the calculatio ns of th ese expected gains mot ivated th e Po lish positio n to some
extent, rather th an it solely bein g driv en by an inflexible regard for histo ric and ethnic
bo nds. Thus, Poland' s Atlanticism in term s of support for US fore ign policy was ind eed
"instinc tua l", but in the sense that it is the fund am ental instinct of every state to maximi ze
their inte rest.
In co nclusion, in view of th e previously stated motives behind Po land 's pro- US ori en-
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ration o n both sec urity matters and for eign polic y, it seems th at Polish Atlanticism was mor e
shrewd than it was blind. This evidence points to Polish Atlauti cism as bein g driven to some
extent by strateg ic calculations rath er th an solely by the oft-c ited historical , ethnic and ideo-
logical ties. But perhaps the most clear-cut confirmation for Polish Atlanticism bein g not as
inflexible as was assumed is its relativ e, nuanced decline after 2003. The followin g section
will briefly examine the decrease in Poland 's level of supp ort for the US in the securi ty and
foreign policy secto rs that has occurred in the years after 2004 so as to furth er solidi fy the
claim that Polish Arlanticism prior to 2004 was more tran sient than formerly th ou ght.
DECLINING ATIANTICISM: A DIMINISHED PREFERENCE FOR NATO?
As stated previously, Poland 's position on the ESOP I NATO issue has served as some-
thing of a bellwether for Polish Atlanticisrn in the securi ty and defense arena. While Poland
still remains highly loyal to NATO, th ere appears to hav e been a decrease in the vehement
rhetoric from Polish leadership about NATO's supremacy ove r ESOP which characterized
the years before 2004 . After this point, "a change in attitude in Warsaw towards ESOP and
CFSP becam e apparent" (Zabor owski 19). While th e Polish position has never been so
clear- cut as to co nsist of total conde m natio n or unrestrained advocacy of ESDP, th ere does
seem also to have been an incr ease in co nstructive en gagement with ESDP development.
Illustrative of this trend is Poland 's " [suppo rt for] th e creation of an EU Armaments and
Research Agen cy (which it has since joined)" (Zaborowski 20) .
If a mark of Poland's pro-US o rientation in the years leading up to 2003 was its level
of devotion to American-dominated avenues of security, th en Polish Atlanticism could be-
said to have suffered a moderate. yet telling, decline after thi s point. In retrospect, this then
suggests that Poland's Arlanti cism before and during its 2003 peak was not so inflexible as
it ma y have appeared at the time. Ind eed, many of th e same transient and mor e calculating
motives that prompted Poland 's pro-US stance on security matters in th is earlier peri od can
be used to explain Poland 's subseque nt nuanced shift in alignment.
One such variable influ en ce was Poland's changing calculations of oppo rtunities for
influence and leadership within th e two security system s. The year 2004 ma rked th e begin-
ning of a new era for Poland as an EU member rath er th an prospective candidate. At this
point,
"Poland'sfonncr status as a .'frimd C! fA nicrica , bUI all outsider in tlu:context cft i«
EU [uras] translonncd, with considerable illlpliClltions.filr ~flarsall" s attitude towards
the European project . .. [uihich] has been evident ill ~Varsall" s illcrl'asill}~/)' positive
attitude towards ... developillg the [ESDP]" (Z aborowski 5).
As stated in the previous section , a large factor behind Poland's reserv e to ward ESOP
included co nce rns that Poland's foreign policy would be dominated by EU power-players,
a situation incompatible with "Warsaw]s]... ambition to playa constructive and important
role within th e EU" (T rzaskowski, " From C andidate to Member State" 37) . However,
on ce in the EU, Poland began to realize that it could become one of the se very power play-
ers. C om bined with its position as one of the largest new member nation s, Poland 's "expe-
rience in Iraq has heightened Poland 's profile in terms of. .. ability to carry out a variety of
operations" (Duke 9). Becaus e of the role it played in Iraq , "other member states.. .came to
see Warsaw as natural member of th e European leading gro up" (Zaborowski 21) . Although
at first resented by some EU leaders , Poland's combat parti cipation in Iraq has led these same
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nations to recognize it J S J promising contributor to European security struc tur es. This th en
has led EU leaders to ex tend to Poland the opportunity to be a seriou s for ce within ESDP .
For instance , a 200 4 Financial T imes article states:
"Fr(//ICC IIl1iSl rethink: i ts.(cJreigll policy . .. mOlJing tlwa ),from all 'cxtlusiuc' dialogue
with Ccrmanv and IjJorkillg u.itl, otherbig countries, acwrding 10 N icolas Sarkoz:v,
France's poweiful [/lI et1-J }illallcc minister... He lists six medium or large countries
- France, Germany, Britain, [tal)', Spain alit! Poland- which need /0 co-operate"
(Cowers).
Also , it was ann ounced in 2004 " that Poland wo uld become the major contribu tor
to a]n ESD P] battle group " formed jointly with Germany (Za borowski 21), a plan which
also spea ks to Poland 's increased engagement with ESD P. Thus, th e same impulse to exert
influ en ce in collective security affilirs that led Poland to vehemently defend the primacy of
NATO prior to 2004 led to the subsequent relaxation of its hard-line Atlanticist stance on
the issue in 2004, after its calculations of lead ership opportunities within ESDP changed .
Again , Poland 's nuanced ret reat from such an un compromising position on the primacy of
NA T O and gradual warming to ESDP furth er substant iates the co ncl usion that Poland's
pro-US o rientatio n was not so unc ompromising as W;IS first pre sumed .
Additionally, th e eco nomic cost-ben efit analysis of contribution s and gains whi ch
drove much of Polish Arlanricism on ESDP was materially altered after 2004. In tenus
of ben efits, cooperation on th e issue of ESDP with its biggest advoca tes, such as Fran ce,
promised improved rapp ort between Poland and more establish ed Eu ropean power-p oles.
This co uld only help J new EU member such as Poland, who "need s [the] support and
good w ill of the stronge r partners. [German and Fren ch] assistan ce is go ing to be ... needed
o n matt ers.. .suc h as adm itt ing Poland to th e Sch en gen agreement and the monetary uni on "
(" Art icle Discusses Imp act o f Alliance w ith U S o n Poland's Position in EU "). After its EU
ascen sion , more constructive engagement on ESDP seemed to carry with it finan cially lu-
crative benefits.
AJso , as stated previou sly, America had "rradjed] away pressure o n the newer NATO
members to upgrade th eir military capabilities... in exc hange for . . .politi cal loyalty" in the
years leading up to Iraq (lacob y 232). This m eant that Poland co uld parti cipate in a col-
lecti ve security system that at the time seem ed at the time to be a mu ch lower cost than
wh at contributing to th e de velopment of ESDP wo uld entail. H owever, once thi s pol itical
support segued into Poland 's increasingly burdensome involvem ent in Iraq, (as th e next
secti on will explore), Poland's calculations of NATO's costs changed . Additionally, it was
stated in 2003 that "once the seco nd wave of[NATO] enlargement takes place, Poland will
be judged on an equal footing with older members and wiJl thus be assessed on issues of
defe nse spe nding and deployability of its arm ed for ces 1110re severely" (Z aboro wski , "B e-
tw een Po wer and Wea kne ss" 9). After 2004 , it was not as clear to Poland whether th e US
would co ntinue to be so len ient in terms of ex pec ted contribution s to NATO. especially
in th e face of America's decreasing fixation o n CEE political loyalty (an issue which will be
addressed in t~e following section). Thus, Poland 's calculations of the financial benefits of
increased engagement wi th ESDP rose whil e its expectations of th e disadvantageous present
and future costs associated with NATO increased . C onsequently, th e sam e economic mo-
tives whi ch demonstrate th at Polish Atlanticism before 2004 was not so blind as it seen led
also ex plains some of Poland 's subtle wanning to ward ESDP after thi s point.
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Lastly, there have been so me alterations in Poland's calculatio ns of both the respective
effectiveness o f ESOP and NATO , and the seriousness of pot ential security risks, whi ch
prompted Poland 's zealo us preferen ce for NATO prior to 2004 . For instan ce, some analysts
have stated that Poland's percepti on of a Russian threat. which initially led its leaders to
favor th e more-viable NATO, had diminished by thi s point . This was due to the (lct that
"Russia, whil st still being 'a state of co ncern ' from the Polish point of view. [was] just too
economically int erdependent within th e EU ... to constitute a 'clear and present danger"
(Za boro wski 25) . Thus, Poland lll ;l Y have felt it now had th e luxury to lessen its reliance on
NATO, espec ially in light of the political and economic ben efits a more op en approach to
ESOP promi sed to hring.
Also , there is evidence to suppo rt the inference that ESOP may have see med much
more viable and promising to Poland in and after 2004. For instance. in th e fall o f 2003 , the
Union completed "the first EU military operation ("Opcrmioll Artcmis") outside the Europe-
an continent ... [tjhe success of {which] shows that th e EU has at least a small genuine mili-
tary operation al capacity" (Uniach 3) . Additionally, "the Europeans are .. .devel oping tools
that will be of paramount importance in the fiiture to fulfill th e goals of strat egic auto nomy.
As an example ,... the y will have about 15 reconnaissance satellites .. .. in th e next 5 years"
(Boy er 7). Thus, the pro spects o f viahie and fully op eration al ESD P increased greatly after
2003. Therefore . it is not at all improbable to presunle that Poland's nuanced shift in their
stance on ESOP had something to do with improved evaluations of its defense viability, giv-
ing Poland the leeway to lessen its uncompromising stanc e on the preferability of NATO.
DECLINING ATLANTICISM: DIMINISHED SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAQ
Nothing defined Poland 's pro-American stance in forei gn policy so much as its diplo-
matic and military suppo rt for the US ' operations in Iraq . Howe ver, as with ESDP, Poland's
ability to he characterized as an uucompromisable Atlanri cist o n the Iraq issue decreased
considerably after 2004. As early as March of that year, Poland's apparently unquestioning
diplomatic support was already diminishing. For instan ce, "President Kwasniew ski admitted
he felt 'mi sled' hy US claims about WMD in Iraq" (jacoby 253). Military support began
to erode not lon g after. After Polish casualties began to increase in the fall of 2004, then-
Defense Minister Szniajdzinski " expressed the view that the ent ire Polish contingent should
withdraw ...hy the end of 2005 " (Zaborowski 14). Althou gh this was not actualized, in
2005 , "the Polish Ministry of Defense announced plans to cut their tro ops to 1,700" (jacob y
254). Thus, in retrospect , th e Atlanticism that initi ally prompted Poland to suppo rt the US
in Iraq was not so unqualified as it seemed during its 2003 heyday. The reason s for thi s
subsequent reorientation represent a Polish reapprai sal of the more tran sient and calculated
factors th at first influenced th eir involvement.
As it did in their initial decision to go to Iraq, econ omic considerations played a key
role in Poland's stance after 2004 . Mu ch of their decreased support can he attributed to the
rising costs associated with involvement, co upled with the disappointment of unre alized
anticipated ben efits . The first o f th ese was the political cost of Polish loyalty to the US,
which fostered resentment on the part of France and Germany which Poland co uld ill afford
as newcom er to the EU. As Elizabeth Pond puts it, " [tjthe Poles ... realized .. .they would
need to sell their cherries and co mputers in Frankfurt, not Houston" (54). The direct costs
of Iraq also turned out to he higher than was predicted. " [A]fter a year in the desert, [the
PolesJ discov ered that. . .they were in over their head s with this magnitude of responsibil-
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iry... even with . . .US fimding for their effo rts" (Pond 54). T o make matters worse, Am erica
started to decrease th e liberality of this fun ding . "During th e thi rd rot atio n [of Polis h troopsI
the Am ericaus radic ally shut off th e sup ply of 1l 1OIIey," states a Warsaw Polirvka journalist
(Cwicluc h). Finally, the eco no mic ben efits of Polish involvemen t largely failed to mat erial-
ize . When reco nstru ct ion begJn , the co nt racts wh ich Polish firm s had anricip ared winning
" turned out to be ex ceedi ngly hard to co me by" (jaco by 253). T o co mp lete th is pic ture of
foiled hop es, Presiden t Bush rejected Pres ident " Kwas niewski' s direct person al appeal for an
end to visa obligatio ns for Polish visitors to th e U nited Stat es" (jacoby 253). A decrease in
Poland's willingness to maint ain loyal sup po rt of Ame rica in the face of disappointed expec-
tations and rising cost s is unders tandable . Ho wever, it also serv es as ret roactive co nfirma rion
that th e previous level of Polish At lauticism o n this issue was ne ither unqu estioning nor
unequivocal, but was to some ext ent m otivated by transient calculations of nat ional int erest.
Al so, as discussed earlier, much of Poland's initial de cision to support the US in Iraq
can be attributed to expecta tio ns that thi s would help them gain the positio n of a favored
ally and leader of a " new" pro-American Europe , en tailing expanded aven ues for influence.
However, thi s hope co uld no lon ger enco urage Po lish suppo rt whe n U S and " old" Europe
began to embark on a co urse of gradua l rapp rochement. By 2004, "both di plomacy and
auto nomous eve nts were nudgin g th e two sides of th e Atlantic-a nd new and old Europe-to-
gether " (Pond 52). As the damage do ne to relation s by the initial wav e of we ste rn Eu ropean
anti- US rhetoric be gan to heal, it be came apparent that th e rift in which th is "New Europe"
hoped to insert itself was closing, and with it, Polish dreams for most-favored ally statu s. In
reference to Pr esident B ush's 2005 ree lectio n , a Po lish journalist wrote " his team ... [now]
co nsists . .. of inrernation alists striv ing to reb uild relation s wi th the " old " E uro pe . The 'n ew '
o ne was left in the lurch " (C wieluch).
CONCLUSIONS
In the years after 2003, th e historic , ethnic and ide ological foundations of Polish At-
Ianr icism remai ned un changed. W hat had been altered was Poland 's polit ical, eco no mic and
strategic cost-benefit calculations of a vehemently pro- U S alignm ent in th e sec urity and
foreign policy sectors. Thus, a not - insignificant part of Poland 's Atlanricism prior to 2004
was grou nded in eva luatio ns of nation al interest m aximization, and cannot be characterized
.IS an inst inctual proclivity to unquestioningly support Am erica du e to unch angeable ties.
This is furt her sup ported by the fact th at Poland 's Atlanti cism suffered a sub tle bur notable
decline after 2004, wh en this ori entat ion no lon ger seemed as promising in te rms of further-
ing Pol and 's influence, eco nomic prospe cts and sec ur ity in th e world of states .
However , relati ve to other E uropea n nation s, Poland rem ains one of th e US's stro n-
gest allies. It is simply that its zea lous level of support for the US W 'IS unten able in the face
of divi sive challenges, such as Iraq, and massive changes , suc h as Po land's entry into the EU .
The same variable factors of interest calculatio ns whic h led to the shift in Po land 's ori ent a-
tion may change ye t again . Therefore , it is no t at all imp rob able to say tha t a heightened
awareness of a Russian threat after th e August War co uld send Polan d back to its forme r
positio n of dedi cated and exclu sive devot ion to NATO with its Article 5 guara ntees and US
Anned Forcesbacking. Also, the rece nt inaugu rat ion of an American president more pop u-
lar in Eu rope and 1I10 re incl ined to ward multilareralism significantl y de creases the probabil-
ity of situat ions in which Poland wi ll be forced to choose between a Scylla of the US and
C harybdis of the EU , as was the case wi th Iraq . Thus, o nl y time will tell w hethe r Poland's
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once- vigo rous Atlanti cism wi ll experience resu rgence to its fo rmer heights, o r remain at a
cordial. ye t temperate level.
END NOTES
1. As then- Presiden t Kwasniewski de scr ibes Poli sh invol vem ent in " Poland's Kwasniewski
Vie ws Postwar Iraq ,Ties wi th US, EU, Russia, Own Future."
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